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Abstract 
 Despite historians describing the 1970s as a time of détente, both National Security 
Advisors that dominated America’s foreign policy pursued harsh stances against the Soviet 
Union.  Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski sabotaged peace talks in order help the United 
States keep its edge against the other world superpower.  Most historians point to the similarities 
between these two men, but what is most often left out of the narrative is that both men 
witnessed persecution at the hands of totalitarian governments: Kissinger by the Nazis and 
Brzezinski by both the Nazis and the Soviets.  This influence is strong in their first works written 
at Harvard University, where they met Dr. Carl J. Friedrich and Hannah Arendt, both German 
émigrés.  This paper will explore how European intellectuals, as well as their own European 
heritage, predisposed both Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski in their hawkish stances 
against the Soviet Union. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Cold War; Kissinger; Brzezinski; Hannah Arendt; American foreign policy; nuclear 
disarmament 
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Introduction 
 In his memoir about being National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote how he 
openly told President Jimmy Carter, “You first have to be a Truman before you are a Wilson.”1  
This frank statement sums up his beliefs about what American foreign policy should be during 
the Cold War.  Only by showing extreme force, as American President Harry S. Truman did 
when he dropped both atomic bombs on Japan to end World War II in 1945, can peace exist, 
which Brzezinski equates with Woodrow Wilson, the architect of the League of Nations.  
However, as this paper shows, Brzezinski was not the only person in Washington who took such 
a hard stance when it came to the Soviet Union.  Henry Kissinger shared these sentiments, 
expressing multiple times throughout the years his own hawkish plans for dealing with the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
From 1947 until 1991, during the Cold War, many Americans viewed this as a time when 
the United States stood up to the ideologically corrupt Soviet Union.  Wanting capitalism to 
stomp out communism, many Americans believed that it was “Better Dead than Red,”2 with red 
of course being the associated color of communists.  This belief dominated American foreign 
policy throughout much of the early years of the Cold War.  However, this marked hostility did 
not sustain itself.  By the beginning of the 1970s, most Americans wanted détente, a relaxing of 
tensions between the two superpowers.  Exhausted by the conflict in Vietnam overseas and the 
Civil Rights Movement at home, Americans wanted peace in the world.3  However, despite the 
                                                 
1 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977 – 1981 (New 
York: Farrar, Straus Giroux, 1983), 176. 
 2 Oswald Garrison Villard, ed. "Work and Play," The Nation 131, no. 3392 (July 9, 1930): 32. 
3 Frank Newport and Joseph Carroll, “Iraq versus Vietnam: A Comparison of Public Opinion: Gallup 
Reviews Public Opinion during the Vietnam War and the Current War in Iraq,” Gallup, August 24, 2005, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/18097/iraq-versus-vietnam-comparison-public-opinion.aspx.  A Gallup poll conducted 
in August and September, 1968 found that 61% of Americans believed that the war in Vietnam was a mistake.  This 
is the height of public dissent.  However, there would not be a significant drop in the percentage of people against 
the conflict.  Anti-war sentiment would remain around 60% for the remainder of the war. 
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country seeming to be weary of conflict, two of the most powerful men in the United States 
government wanted the exact opposite.  From 1969 until 1980, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski actively fought against the easing of tensions between the United States and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the point of advocating the possibility of nuclear war.  As 
they transformed the office of National Security Advisor, a position both men held, into the 
primary manager of American foreign policy, both Kissinger and Brzezinski were in a position 
to sabotage peace talks, such as the strategic arms limitation treaties, with the Soviet Union in an 
effort to keep the United States on top.   
 Many historians postulate that the reason these men took such an uncompromising stance 
was due to their desire to fit in with the Washington establishment.4  Up until this point, almost 
all men working in high positions for the government were white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants; 
therefore, in order for the German Jew and the Polish Catholic to be accepted, they believed they 
had to be more pro-American than traditional East Coast establishment Americans.  However, 
this paper will argue that rather than a need to want to fit in, these men acted from a desire more 
personal to them.  Both men were émigrés from Europe who had grown up in Europe during a 
time of turmoil and discontent.  They witnessed the advent of totalitarianism in the 1930s, both 
under the guise of National Socialism as well as Communism, which haunted them well after 
they left Europe.  Evidence suggests that it was their European experience, and the witnessing of 
their homelands torn apart by war and totalitarian regimes, that influenced their diplomatic 
                                                 
 4 Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 4, 10-11.  Suri describes how Kissinger felt excluded due to his Jewish faith.  However, 
Kissinger was able to exploit his German heritage, touting his special insight, in order to go from outsider to 
informed insider; Justin Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski: America’s Grand Strategist, trans. Catherine Porter 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 3, 117-156.  Vaïsse illustrates how Brzezinski was part of an 
educated, non-WASP group of academics who wished to make their mark on America’s political landscape.  For 
more information, see Chapter Three. 
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decisions during the 1970s.  Although to date most scholars opt to write about Kissinger, it was 
not he alone who influenced America’s foreign policy during the Cold War.  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski’s hawkish views on United States-Soviet Union relations was long-lasting and just as 
influential.  Both men took a harsh stance because, to them, the Cold War was “not an abstract 
phenomenon – it created a personal sense of peril.”5  Based on personal memoirs, Cold War 
strategic writings, and documents from Foreign Relations of the United States, this paper will 
trace the hawkish Cold War policies of these two immigrants from Central Europe.  This paper 
will also contribute to American Cold War intellectual and strategic history. 
Birth to Harvard 
           In order to understand why these men were so adamant in their harsh stance against the 
Soviet Union, one may only look to their upbringing and education.  Born Heinz Alfred 
Kissinger on May 27, 1923, in Fürth, Bavaria, Germany, he enjoyed life as a middle class boy in 
a family that valued education.  Along with other Jewish families living in this area, the 
Kissingers saw themselves as multicultural, identifying as both Jewish and German culturally 
and nationally.6  However, this view of themselves would not safeguard them against persecution 
for Fürth is not far from Nuremberg, one of the early strongholds of the Nazi Party.7  In 
Nuremberg, newspaper publisher Julius Streicher coordinated efforts with Hitler to increase Nazi 
support among German citizens; this culminated in the 1935 headline splashed across Streicher’s 
newspaper Der Stürmer stating, “The Jews are our misfortune!”8  As Nazism and anti-Semitism 
took hold in Nuremberg, Kissinger noticed several societal changes, from family friends 
                                                 
 5 Suri, 138.  
 6 Ibid., 26.  
 7 Niall Ferguson, Kissinger. Vol.1, 1923 – 1968: The Idealist (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 64-65.  
 8 Suri, 34-35.  
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disappearing without a trace to his own expulsion from school and even his father losing his job.9  
It seemed as if the Nazi Party began controlling every aspect of his life.  This is how Kissinger 
and his family viewed the changes in his life because he often states that it was his dislike of the 
Nazis, not his love of being Jewish, that still resonated with him.10  No longer allowed to play 
with his neighborhood friends, confined indoors for fear of persecution, Kissinger welcomed his 
move to the United States at the age of fifteen, in 1938.11  Setting up in Washington Heights in 
New York City, Heinz changed his name to Henry and pursued his education. 
However, Kissinger would not spend the entirety of World War II in the United States.  
In 1943, he received his draft notice into the Army.  Although not wanting to interrupt his 
studies, he dutifully packed his bags and went to war.  Kissinger hoped to show his patriotism by 
serving his new country.12  While in boot camp, Kissinger met a German-American mentor.  
Fritz Kraemer, born in Essen, Germany, enjoyed taking long walks with Kissinger so that the 
two men could philosophize about how their homeland no longer existed.13  It was through these 
talks that Kraemer discovered how much seeing atrocities orchestrated by a totalitarian dictator 
affected his friend stating, “Kissinger is a strong man, but the Nazis were able to damage his soul 
… It made him seek order.”14  Eventually, with the war over and the Allied victory secured, 
Henry Kissinger was able to return home and continue his studies.  Thanks to the GI bill, he was 
able to attend Harvard University for both his undergraduate and graduate careers.15 
                                                 
 9 Ibid., 65.  
 10 Ferguson, 80-81.  
 11 Suri, 25.  
12 Philip Taubman, The Partnership: Five Cold Warriors and Their Quest to Ban the Bomb (New York: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 2012), 122.  
13 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 44.  
14 Ibid., 121-122.  
 15 Suri, 45.  
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It was at Harvard that Henry Kissinger first met Zbigniew Brzezinski.  Brzezinski was born in 
Warsaw, Poland on March 28, 1928.  His father, Tadeusz Brzezinski, was a Polish consular 
official.16  From 1931 until 1935, Brzezinski’s father held a diplomatic post in Leipzig, 
Germany.  While in Germany, Tadeusz Brzezinski helped with efforts to rescue European Jews 
from Nazi concentration camps; Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin would officially 
recognize his father’s role in 1978.17  Then, from 1936 – 1938, Tadeusz Brzezinski lived in the 
Soviet Ukraine while his family remained in Warsaw.  While representing Poland in Ukraine, 
Tadeusz Brzezinski witnessed Joseph Stalin’s Great Purge where hundreds of Ukrainian 
dissidents faced arrest and execution, all in order to stamp out the Ukrainian Nationalist 
Movement.  He would share stories of the horrors he witnessed with his wife and son upon 
returning to Warsaw.18  In late 1938, Tadeusz Brzezinski moved his family to Montreal, Canada.   
 While in Montreal, Zbigniew Brzezinski attended McGill University for his 
undergraduate and master’s degrees.  It was in his master’s thesis on Russo – Soviet nationalism 
that Brzezinski’s hawkish views towards the Soviet Union first became apparent.  It was in this 
thesis where he stated that the Soviet Union struggled with unity and therefore, “the Western 
world has at its disposal all the means to create a multi-national anti-Soviet version of the 
Comintern [Communist International] – and its appeal would be exceedingly powerful.”19 With 
these words, Brzezinski stated that Communism in the Soviet Union was easy to topple, for all 
the United States needed to do was exploit the differences between the various satellite states 
both within and adjacent to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.  This interest in the Soviet 
                                                 
 16 It is of interest to note that Zbigniew Brzezinski’s father fought against the Bolsheviks in the Polish – 
Soviet War of 1919 – 1920.  Clearly, his father was not a fan of the new regime in charge of Russia and he probably 
shared his feelings with his son, like he did after witnessing Stalin’s Great Purge.  
 17 Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski: America’s Grand Strategist, 15.  
 18 Ibid., 17.  
 19 Ibid., 20. 
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Union coincided with the emerging field of Sovietology, the study of the society and politics of 
that country as well as its satellite states.  Therefore, to expand his horizons for his doctoral 
work, he applied for and accepted admission to Harvard University, where he could specialize in 
his field of choice.  Brzezinski chose to attend this university because it was where researchers in 
the field exchanged ideas with politicians, so that theories could be put into action.20  It was at 
Harvard where Brzezinski actively worked at the Russian Research Center, where he not only 
studied contemporary Soviet policy, but also tried to predict future Soviet threats to American 
interests. 
 Historians do not point out that both these men attended Harvard University, yet it was 
here that their future foreign policies started to form.  As Justin Vaïsse writes, “They were 
trailblazers in a profoundly transformed landscape of international policy making, the pioneers of 
a new model of American foreign policy elite.”21  During the early Cold War years, Harvard 
wanted to prepare its students for life in the postwar world.  In order to do this, many professors 
worked to make this university a center for formulating the nation’s strategic concept to guide 
American foreign policy.  Kissinger and Brzezinski played a role in this by creating Harvard’s 
Center for International Affairs, where they worked closely with Professor Carl J. Friedrich.22  A 
German immigrant himself, Friedrich, who was a leader of Harvard’s Government Department, 
supervised both men and their writings on American-Soviet relations.23  It was during this time 
that Friedrich introduced both Kissinger and Brzezinski to noted political theorist Hannah Arendt 
and her first major work, The Origins of Totalitarianism.  Arendt, a student of Martin 
                                                 
 20 Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski: America’s Grand Strategist, 47.  
 21 Justin Vaïsse, “Zbig, Henry, and the New U.S. Foreign Policy Elite,” in Zbig: The Strategy and 
Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed. Charles Gati (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 5.  
 22 Ibid., 8.  
23 Isaacson, 63.  
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Heidegger’s, was another German émigré in the United States.  After her book’s publication in 
1951, the idea of totalitarianism received such intense reviews that the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences sponsored a conference on the topic at the Russian Research Center, chaired 
by Friedrich.24 
 The reason that this new concept fascinated scholars was because Arendt puts forth the 
idea that totalitarianism was a new form of government never seen before.  Although this type of 
government borrowed heavily from other political systems, such as Fascism, authoritarianism, 
and military dictatorship, for Arendt what sets totalitarianism apart was, “mass organizations of 
atomized, isolated individuals.”25  She also added, “Compared with all other parties and 
movements, their most conspicuous external characteristic is their demand for total, unrestricted, 
unconditional, and unalterable loyalty of the individual member.”26  In order for totalitarianism 
to become successful, and take over a nation-state, society had to become a classless mass, 
subjected to constant propaganda upholding the organization running the country.  In Germany, 
the Nazis used propaganda in an effort to bolster the master race while in the Soviet Union, the 
Bolsheviks used propaganda to illustrate class struggles.27  The goal of totalitarian rule was to 
break society apart, smashing not only interest groups but family units as well.28  Although 
starting in Italy under Mussolini, it was in Hitler’s Germany that politics invaded, and quickly 
encompassed, all private spheres in an individual’s life, which would eventually lead to 
                                                 
 24 Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 123.  
25 Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 
1951), 323.   
 26 Ibid., 323.   
 27 Ibid., 375.  
 28 Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Totalitarianism: Proceedings of a Conference Held at the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences March 1953 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 76.  
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totalitarianism’s conquest over society.29  Another factor which aided totalitarianism’s triumph 
was the denationalization occurring after World War I, which happened via the forced removal 
of Europeans from their established homelands back to their ancestral lands, leading many 
people feeling disconnected and alone.30  The League of Nations estimated that between 1917 
and 1924, Germany alone accepted upwards of 700,000 refugees from all over Europe.31  Both 
the Nazi Party and the Bolsheviks exploited this loneliness, welcoming members and 
indoctrinating them, “to the point of complete loss of individual claims and ambition … 
extinguishing individual identity permanently.”32  It was this loss of identity, and the need to feel 
included, of which both Hitler and Stalin took advantage.  Most historians before Arendt 
proposed that these men became leaders of their respective political parties because of their 
rhetorical and manipulation skills.  Arendt disagrees, stating that Hitler and Stalin were not mere 
demagogues, but master organizers.  These two men attracted the masses because of their 
“visible reality and [the] power of a ‘living organization,’” which was in stark contrast to the 
‘dead’ bureaucracies which forced these people from the places they called home for 
generations.33  Arendt goes on to argue that it was the faith which these men inspired from their 
loyal party members which allowed them to seek “total domination and global rule.”34   
 In order to start down the path of total world domination, both Hitler and Stalin took the 
same course of action.  First, instead of writing laws and making order, power came from their 
will.  They accomplished this by always expanding the ranks of people loyal to them, while at 
                                                 
 29 Gleason, 20-22. 
 30 Arendt, 269. 
31 Robert W. Ditchburn, "The Refugee Problem." Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 28, no. 110 (1939): 
278. 
32 Arendt, 314.  
 33 Ibid., 361.  
 34 Ibid., 389.  
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the same time strictly limiting the number of elite, high ranking officials allowed within the 
party.35  This kept people from questioning their authority.  Nazism and Stalinism both 
emphasized politics over everything else in society, including economics, in order to bolster the 
state.36  Next came the implementation of the leader’s ideology; for Hitler, it was success of the 
master race and for Stalin, it was eliminating social classes in order to empower the workers of 
the world.  This step was important because, as Arendt states, “the ‘totalitarian state’ is a state in 
appearance only, and the movement no longer truly identifies itself even with the needs of the 
people.”37 She would go on to say, “The Movement by now is above state and people, ready to 
sacrifice both for the sake of its ideology.”38  This sacrifice came in the final step taken by both 
Hitler and Stalin in order to solidify their totalitarian regimes – mass liquidation of dissenters.  In 
both Germany and the Soviet Union, millions lost their lives in purges for being political 
dissidents.  After this was done, “those who were not among the many millions of dead or the 
millions of deported slave laborers had learned ‘who is master here,’ and realized that their lives 
and the lives of their families depended not upon their fellow-citizens but exclusively on the 
whims of the government,”39 the physical embodiment being Hitler for Germany and Stalin for 
the Soviet Union.  Although both the Nazi and the Soviet totalitarian states created different 
origin myths, with Germany’s resting on racial superiority and the Soviet Union’s relying on 
elimination of social classes, both ended in the same place – the government needed to control 
every aspect of a person’s life in order for the country to become the perfect state.40 
                                                 
 35 Ibid., 365-366. 
 36 Gleason, 31.  
37 Arendt, 266.  
 38 Ibid., 266.  
 39 Ibid., 320.  
 40 Gleason, 37-38.  
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 Arendt also viewed totalitarian governments as self-perpetuating.  To her, the only reason 
the Nazis did not continue ruling Germany was due to the Allies winning the war.  After World 
War II, in the early years of the Cold War the West increasingly connected Stalinism with 
totalitarianism “as they witnessed the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe, they linked its 
expansionism to its autocratic, centralized, internal structure and its relentless invasiveness.”41  
Even after Stalin’s death, Arendt and other scholars did not see an end to the totalitarian regime 
in the Soviet Union.  Since all dissidents were killed, any leader who took control after Stalin 
would most likely be in lockstep with his ideals.  Later, once Nikita Khrushchev came to power 
and did not completely undo the ideology started by his predecessor, despite condemning the 
‘Stalin cult,’ it became clear that totalitarianism would become the “great mobilizing and 
unifying concept of the Cold War.”42  Arendt’s book profoundly influenced Kissinger’s thinking, 
a subject most historians neglect to mention.   
Kissinger – Post Harvard 
 While at Harvard, Kissinger realized he wanted his writings to influence more than just 
his fellow academics.  As stated above, Kissinger worked with the German-American Dr. 
Friedrich, allowing Friedrich to mentor Kissinger as he started the academic journal Confluence 
in an effort to influence policymakers.  Kissinger asked many people to contribute to the journal, 
personally meeting with all writers in order to discuss their contributions, Hannah Arendt being 
one of them.  Despite not editorializing within the pages of Confluence, we know that Kissinger 
at least had a professional relationship with Arendt because he made it a point to sit down with 
all of his journal’s contributors.43  Although the journal only lasted for six years, it helped 
                                                 
 41 Arendt, 72.  
 42 Gleason, 3.  
 43 Isaacson, 72-73. 
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Kissinger solidify his harsh stance against the Soviet Union.  Of note is the time frame in which 
these two intellectuals met.  While Kissinger was writing his doctoral thesis entitled “A World 
Restored,” he stated, “Diplomacy cannot be divorced from the realities of force and power.”  
This notion rings true of Arendt’s views on the Soviet Union.   
 Henry Kissinger wrote his doctoral thesis while working with his Harvard mentor, 
William Yandell Elliott.  Elliott and Friedrich were “twin pillars of the Government Department” 
at Harvard University, both influencing their young mentee.44  Although not German, Elliott 
believed in the teachings of German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who wrote extensively about 
the intrinsic nature of freedom.  Before taking Kissinger under his tutelage, Dr. Elliott had him 
write an extensive research paper on the philosopher.  William Yandell Elliott only agreed to the 
tutelage of Henry Kissinger after he showed a deep understanding of Immanuel Kant, as 
showcased in his undergraduate thesis.45  Between the German influences of Kraemer, Friedrich, 
and Kant, as well as Elliott’s specialization in European political theory and relations, the 
foundation of Kissinger’s future hawkishness began to form.  Elliott even noticed the heavy 
German influence on Kissinger’s thinking in a letter he wrote to Phi Beta Kappa on his mentee’s 
behalf describing Kissinger as having an “[in] depth and philosophical insight … Teutonic in its 
systematic thoroughness.”46  Even as early as his doctoral thesis, “A World Restored,” Kissinger 
wrote, “Whenever peace – conceived as the avoidance of war – has been the primary objective of 
a power or group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 63.  
45 Isaacson points out that Kissinger’s undergraduate thesis, coming in at 383 pages, is the longest one ever 
submitted by a senior at Harvard University.  In this thesis, not only does Kissinger discuss Immanuel Kant, but he 
also explores the works of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee.  He explores the concept of free will, questioning 
whether humanity actually has it.  Eventually, Kissinger settles on yes, humans do have free will.  While he believes 
this to be true, Harvard decided to put a check on free reign.  Thanks to Kissinger’s magnum opus, the government 
department now limits undergraduate theses to a third the length that the future Secretary of State submitted. 
46 Ibid., 63.  
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member of the international community.”47  His opinion, that peaceful nations are at the mercy 
of aggressive ones, seem to be a result of the influence of Elliott and the Harvard community, for 
it was there that academics postulated that President Eisenhower’s defense plans at the time were 
too soft and accommodating.48  The atomic bomb existed.  Therefore, it needed to be included in 
America’s foreign policy.  Eisenhower’s efforts to curb military spending in order to prevent the 
exhaustion of the financial resources of the United States seemed too drastic once it was 
common knowledge that the Soviet Union built their own nuclear weapons.  Kissinger would 
even state outright that it was these Harvard community discussions “from which my thinking 
evolved,” namely his hawkishness toward the Soviet Union.49 
 Also during this time, the Council on Foreign Relations asked Henry Kissinger to head a 
project which looked at nuclear weapons as they pertained to foreign policy.50  This led to the 
publishing in 1957 of Kissinger’s harshest critique of the Soviet Union with Nuclear Weapons 
and Foreign Policy.  In this work, Kissinger actively supported limited nuclear strikes against the 
Soviet Union.  With the 1950s being marked by the policies of mutually assured destruction 
(MAD) and massive retaliation, Kissinger believed that nuclear war was inevitable.  To him, in 
order for the United States to ensure victory the country must act now, before the Soviet Union 
drew first blood.51  Growing up in the shadow of appeasement, the realist Kissinger saw a weak 
government as unacceptable.  Therefore, in order to ensure peace and to keep the Soviet Union at 
bay, nuclear weapons were necessary.  This allowed America to act proactively, instead of 
                                                 
47  Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 1957), 1. 
48 Taubman, 124.  
49 Ibid., 124-125.  
50 Ibid., 125.  
 51 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), 
17. 
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reactively, to Soviet threats.52  To Kissinger, the United States should have trounced the Soviet 
Union from the beginning of the Cold War.  He believed that the Soviet Union would never stop 
fighting the United States because communist ideology believed that achieving peace could only 
happen once capitalism became extinct.53  Since the United States was not aggressive enough 
when it had nuclear superiority, two things happened: one, the Soviets gained the psychological 
upper hand by making Americans think the United States was too heavily armed, and two, the 
Soviets achieved nuclear parity by being able to build their own atomic bomb.54 Although the 
Kremlin often conjured up images of nuclear war to shame the White House, this did not stop 
them from starting a stockpile.55  Once the Soviets were on the road toward nuclear parity, 
Kissinger believed it was only a matter of time before the communists launched their nuclear 
weapons.   
 Therefore, in order to limit the number of casualties, Kissinger supported the concept of a 
limited war which, “with proper tactics, nuclear war need not be as destructive as it appears 
when we think of it in terms of traditional warfare … Limited nuclear war represents our most 
effective strategy against nuclear powers or against a major power which is capable of 
substituting manpower for technology.”56  Kissinger would go on to state that “no diplomatic 
program can be a substitute for an adequate retaliatory power.”57  Although it seems horrific to 
accept limited nuclear strikes, growing up in Nazi Germany showed Kissinger early on that 
violence is endemic to international politics – it made him into a realist.  It also taught him that in 
                                                 
 52 Daniel J. Sargent, A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 
1970s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 59.  
 53 Henry A. Kissinger, "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace," Foreign Affairs 37, no. 1 (1958): 6.  
 54 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 16–34.  
 55 Ibid., 93. 
 56 Ibid., 146, 166.  
 57 Ibid., 168.  
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order to lead successfully, one must always be “anticipating inevitable tragedies in the course of 
legitimate foreign policymaking.”58  Kissinger took a firm stance against the Soviet Union, and 
against most people’s judgment, by advocating limited nuclear war.  He believed his strategy 
was the best way to cripple the Soviet Union because, by launching small nuclear weapons, the 
United States could just take out Soviet factories and military bases strategically.  By using 
smaller weapons, allowing for control of the blast force, this limited war would only throw the 
Soviet Union into a state of chaos and panic, and therefore not destroying half the world.59  To 
Kissinger, this was compromise. 
 Once this nuclear treatise became a best seller, Harvard University’s dean of faculty 
McGeorge Bundy, who would go on to become President John F. Kennedy’s National Security 
Advisor, offered Henry Kissinger a professorship.  Kissinger readily accepted with his eye on 
tenure.  The late 1950s was a highly competitive time for professors vying for tenure.  Beating 
out fellow classmate Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger accepted the permanent position in 
July 1959.60  He remained at Harvard for the next decade, and during these years Kissinger 
published work after work condemning the Soviet Union for its nuclear buildup and challenging 
American hegemony.  Five years after Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Kissinger wrote 
The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy in 1962.  In this volume, 
Kissinger warned that as the Soviet Union keeps adding to their stockpile of weapons, the United 
States’ power on the world stage keeps diminishing.  Illustrating his point was that starting in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union began expanding its influence into developing 
nations in South America, Asia, and Africa.  Kissinger believed this expanding of Communist 
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influence into the Global South in turn created instability and chaos in the free world.61   
Hearkening back to his doctoral dissertation, Kissinger believed that international “[s]tability is 
the prime goal of diplomacy.”62  With stability versus peace in mind, there was no gain from the 
United States paring down their nuclear weapons supply.  Instead, America should concentrate 
on inventing more strategic nuclear weapons.  Only then could the United States form a 
comprehensive foreign policy, only then could the United States regain world superiority.  He 
reiterated this by writing, “[the United States] cannot gear our strategy or stake our survival on 
the assumption that nuclear weapons will not be used against us … We have to be prepared for 
nuclear war as well.  Only being ready for limited nuclear war will give the option of a 
conventional strategy [author’s emphasis].”63  In Kissinger’s mind, it was almost always the 
Soviet Union that made the first aggressive move, therefore causing the United States to have to 
react.64 
 In 1962, the same year that Kissinger published this latest book, the Cuban Missile Crisis 
rocked the globe.  The world held its collective breath for thirteen days waiting to see if the 
Soviets would launch their missiles at the United States from Cuban soil.  Luckily, the nuclear 
war did not come to fruition with both sides giving in to demands expressed by the other – the 
Soviets removed their atomic warheads from Cuba in public view while the United States 
withdrew their nuclear weapons from Turkey privately.  Although outwardly it seemed as if 
America won a great victory, this was wrong.  Kissinger wanted this to be a wakeup call for the 
United States.  Lulled into a false sense of security, surrounded by two oceans and no attack on 
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its own soil for over one hundred years, Kissinger expected the Cuban Missile Crisis to cause the 
American government to address actively “issues of strategy.”65  Instead, the American people 
protested all nuclear weapons, wanting a reduction of all defense spending.66  This desire of the 
American people could not have sat well with Kissinger, who firmly believed that “the horrors of 
nuclear war are not likely to be avoided by a reduction of nuclear armaments.”67  However, 
Kissinger knew that America’s greatest problem, when it came to foreign policy, was that it 
oscillated between overconfidence and lack of conviction.  This uncertainty, due to a lack of a 
grand strategy, led to the Soviets buttressing their nuclear stockpiles in another attempt to gain 
the upper hand in the nuclear balance of power by the end of the decade.68 
 Up until the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union lagged so far behind the United States in 
“nuclear strategic forces” that the Red Army had only attacked its own allies.69  Instead of using 
force against the United States, the only country to witness the Soviet Union’s might was 
Hungary.  However, as the American government began to crack down on nuclear proliferation, 
all in response to civilian protests at home, the Soviets made inroads in closing the nuclear 
weapons gap with the United States.  Humiliated on the world stage, the Soviets reacted to the 
Cuban Missile Crisis with gusto.  Within six years of the event, the Soviet Union under Premier 
Leonid Brezhnev went from 220 to 860 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and from 100 
to 120 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).70  During this time, the Soviets 
concentrated on larger weapons with heavier payloads, while refining the technology which 
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improved accuracy.71   To Kissinger, Brezhnev represented all that was wrong with Communism 
– he was a leader dedicated to his ideology prevailing, and who would stop at nothing until the 
United States was in a weaker position.72   
By the end of the 1960s, Kissinger was finally in a position to change American foreign 
policy.  On January 20, 1969, Richard Milhous Nixon became the thirty seventh President of the 
United States.  Nixon chose Kissinger to become his National Security Advisor; this was no 
accident.  On January 7, 1969, before even being sworn into office, Richard Nixon sent a memo 
to both Henry Kissinger and William P. Rogers, whom Nixon would select as Secretary of State, 
stating his desire “to move some of the dead wood out and to move some of the unqualified men 
from one post to a less sensitive one.”73  Nixon first moved to Washington DC in 1946, giving 
him more than two decades to figure out the inner workings of the American government.  
Therefore, in order for government to work the way he wanted, Nixon knew that he needed to fill 
key positions with qualified people.  Ever the anti-Communist, it is easy to see that Nixon chose 
Kissinger due to his hawkish stance when it came to the Soviet Union.  Kissinger took this 
opportunity given to him to take his anti-Communist agenda to a global scale.  He was able to do 
this because the National Security Act of 1947 does not specify how the National Security 
Advisor and the National Security Council interacts with the President.  No laws do.74  
Originally only coordinating foreign affairs and defense, Kissinger slowly absorbed more and 
more power within the National Security Council until he amassed more power than Secretary of 
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State Rogers.75  Kissinger was able to consolidate his power within the West Wing thanks in 
large part to his fully formed foreign policy ideas.  He saw the strategic vision, which began in 
his childhood, come to maturation and fruition.76 While becoming privy to top secret information 
thanks to his new elevated position, Kissinger realized his biggest fear had come true – “the 
Soviets had caught up with us – and they continued to build.”77   
 However, Kissinger did see a bright side.  The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was 
suffering from economic woes due to its massive increase in nuclear weapons production.  
Therefore, if a dialogue began with Brezhnev now, the United States could regain its position of 
power.  On February 17, 1969, less than a month after becoming National Security Advisor, 
Kissinger reached out to Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to request a sit down to discuss 
strategic arms limitations negotiations.  The White House put forth that these talks represented a 
beginning of détente, or relaxation of tensions, between the world’s superpowers.  However, as 
William Burr and Jeffrey P. Kimball state, both Nixon and Kissinger “privately saw détente less 
as an idealist end in itself than as a ‘strategy to contain and harness Soviet use of its increasing 
power’ by ensnaring the Soviet Union in ‘a web of relationships with … the United States, a web 
that he [Kissinger] would weave.”78  Clearly, although their foreign policy seemed to promote 
cooperation, in fact it was just furthering containment.   
Beginning in November 1969 in Helsinki, Finland, and lasting until May 1972 in 
Moscow, the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union remained hidden from the 
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public on both sides.   One possible reason that Kissinger used private talks instead of public 
negotiations was, as he wrote in 1955, because “the only valid reason to hold summits with the 
communists was to assuage allies and score points with neutral nations.”79  With the Vietnam 
War still ongoing at this time, Kissinger did not feel the need to pander to either allies or neutral 
countries because he did not want to answer questions dealing with Southeast Asia.  Using these 
back channels also allowed for the President to appear outwardly tough on Communism, yet still 
privately agree with possible compromise.  Since both countries sought different aims, 
eventually different limitations were set for each.  Throughout the previous decade, before Nixon 
and Kissinger came to office, the Soviet Union concentrated on building heavy nuclear missiles, 
but still worked on perfecting their targeting systems.80  By the time of Kissinger’s appointment 
to National Security Advisor, America had 1054 ICBMs, while the Soviet Union had 1550.  The 
United States had 41 nuclear submarines, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had 42.  
The only place where the United States had superior numbers was in long-range aircraft bombers 
and a global naval presence.81  Although the numbers seem to suggest that the United States and 
the Soviet Union were on par with each other, this was not the case.  For one, when Kissinger 
became the National Security Advisor, the United States had more than 29,000 nuclear bombs.82  
As if those were not enough to destroy their enemy, American scientists spent the 1960s 
concentrating on building smaller weapons with more accurate targeting systems.  This nuclear 
strategy, built on smaller, more accurate weaponry, echoed Kissinger’s sentiments about limited 
war.  He did not see a largescale war breaking out, often mentioning that, “It’s difficult to believe 
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either side will launch everything.”83  However, this did not stop Kissinger from encouraging 
President Nixon to use a “madman” strategy in order to cow the Kremlin.84  By constantly 
threatening to launch their entire nuclear force at the Soviet Union, both the President and the 
National Security Advisor kept the Soviets constantly guessing as to their intentions.  This 
guessing game allowed for Kissinger to have the upper hand when nuclear reduction talks began.  
Kissinger saw it as his duty to create negotiations with the Soviet Union that reduced the number 
of missiles on the Soviet side, but still allowed the United States to remain numerically superior.  
As Kissinger stated in his autobiography entitled The White House Years, “It was in our interest 
to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that given the inequality of resources it could not possibly 
win an arms race, that we would not stand by while the balance shifted against us, and that if 
sufficiently provoked, we would simply outproduce them.”85   To Kissinger, the United States 
could not stand to lose any weapons for fear of falling behind the Soviet Union, while the 
communists could not keep building due to economic woes.  Therefore, the creation of a 
strategic compromise, which gave the world the illusion of losses taken by both sides, happened.  
As Kissinger predicted, the Soviets were just as willing to concede in order to slow the 
arms race, due to economic woes.  Outwardly, according to Francis J. Gavin, “the policy goal of 
both superpowers, according to strategists and arms control advocates, should be to construct 
nuclear forces and strategies that accepted mutual vulnerability and did not seek a first strike 
advantage.”86   Kissinger then proposed that the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT I) be 
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broken up into two treaties – the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty (ABM) and the Interim 
Agreement.87   
Kissinger was the main negotiator for the ABM Treaty, which was part of the SALT I 
treaty arrangement.  This permanent treaty “limited ABM systems to two sites each with a limit 
of 100 anti-ballistic missiles.”88  By limiting the number of defense systems that each country 
could build, both sides could feel as if they had won a victory by not bankrupting their country 
through the construction of them.  The treaty limited the number of anti-ballistic missiles to 
defend against strategic ballistic missiles; however, Kissinger ensured the treaty never concretely 
defined the term ‘strategic’.  This was not by accident.  Kissinger allowed for a limitation on 
anti-ballistic missiles because he was more concerned with the new technology of multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) at the time.  MIRVs contain several nuclear 
warheads in each missile that can be independently aimed at various targets.  Again, a 
convenient weapon for limited war.  The reason Kissinger wanted MIRVs to not be included in 
the SALT I negotiations was twofold: one, these were seen as a way of protecting American 
lives from Soviet attack thus making the United States’ strategy defensive instead of overtly 
offensive and two, this was a technology the Soviets lacked thus giving the United States the 
upper hand.89  Both sides seemed comfortable with leaving the exact definition of the word 
‘strategic’ opaque, thus allowing loose interpretations for both the United States and the Soviet 
Union.  As John H. Barton points out, “the agreements greatly increased strategic stability, but 
they did not substantially slow the arms competition, and perhaps even helped accelerate it.”90  
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Although both sides agreed to limits on delivery systems, there was no ceiling set on warheads.91  
Outwardly, Nixon and Kissinger sold the SALT I treaty to the United States Senate touting the 
achievement of symmetry between the world’s superpowers, when in reality the opposite was 
true.92  This was no equal treaty. 
Along with the ABM treaty, the Interim Agreement, mainly negotiated by the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), headed by Gerard C. Smith, came into effect.  This 
was one of the few times Nixon, giving into pressures from Congress, allowed for a committee, 
and not Kissinger alone, to negotiate with a foreign power.  The Interim Agreement, “a five-year 
agreement (1972 – 1977) that restricted particular classes of offensive nuclear forces,” was a 
temporary treaty that negotiators would eventually address in further detail later.93  At this time, 
it froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers each side possessed as well as 
permitted for an increase in SLBMs only if there was a dismantling of a corresponding number 
of ICBMs.  Due to the wording in the agreement, both sides were able to dismantle older 
missiles and replace them with new ones, the only limit being that there could be no new nuclear 
silos built.  Theoretically, this allowed for all replacements to be on a one-to-one basis.  For now, 
Moscow’s ‘momentum’ of military buildup stopped and there was a sense of a stable, strategic 
balance of nuclear weapons.94  The Interim Agreement created a holding pattern, anchoring the 
ABM Treaty by limiting nuclear arms competition and providing more time for further 
negotiations.   
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After the signing by both parties on May 26, 1972, it pleased the American government 
and people so much that the United States Senate ratified both treaties on August 3, 1972.  The 
House of Representatives approved SALT I 307 to 4, and the Senate passed it with a vote of 88 
to 2.95  It seemed as if the buildup of tension since 1947 was getting a reprieve, finally.  
However, Kissinger knew better.  Through his strategic omissions, the United States could 
continue to accumulate a stockpile of strategic weapons without violating the agreement.96  He 
managed to convince the world that tensions were easing while at the same time allowing the 
United States to keep nuclear superiority.  James Goody, an American arms negotiator, states 
that SALT I was important because it “broke the ice … A precedent was set for more important 
agreements later … But it did little to halt the nuclear arms race.”97  Kissinger echoed this 
sentiment in his autobiography Years of Upheaval by writing, “after the signature of SALT I, our 
defense budget increased…Détente did not prevent resistance to Soviet expansion; on the 
contrary, it fostered the only possible psychological framework for such resistance.”98  Through 
his deft negotiating strategy, and keeping the United States militarily superior to the Soviet 
Union, Kissinger kept the communist dictators from gaining the upper hand in the nuclear arms 
race. 
Brzezinski – Post Harvard 
 Most historians readily draw the parallel between Arendt and Brzezinski.  After reading 
her book, Brzezinski would ever after define both Communism as well as Fascism and Nazism 
as totalitarian revolutionary ideology aimed not so much at helping the people, but brainwashing 
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the masses.99  Leaders such as Stalin, and later Khrushchev and Brezhnev, needed to have this 
control over their people in order to consolidate and maintain their political power.100  Brzezinski 
seemed particularly interested in these leaders because they conquered his homeland of Poland 
and locked it behind the Iron Curtain.101   While attending Harvard, Brzezinski solidified the 
thought that “Stalin’s will could not be questioned.”102   
 It was this sentiment that prompted Dr. Carl J. Friedrich to ask his mentee, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, to help coauthor a book.  Friedrich, a friend of Hannah Arendt’s, wanted to take her 
work and make it more applicable to the Soviet Union.  Arendt’s influence from Origins of 
Totalitarianism is undeniable in Friedrich’s and Brzezinski’s Totalitarian Dictatorship and 
Autocracy, which came out five years after Arendt’s work, in 1956.  Totalitarian Dictatorship 
and Autocracy blends Friedrich’s dislike of the Soviet Union with Arendt’s view of isolation and 
atomization.  To this, Brzezinski added his impressions of Soviet dictatorship, told to him by his 
father.  Expanding on Arendt’s explanation on how Hitler and Stalin obtained power, Friedrich 
and Brzezinski mapped out six factors needed to make a successful totalitarian dictatorship: “an 
ideology, a single party typically led by one man, a terroristic police, a communications 
monopoly, a weapons monopoly, and a centrally directed economy.”103  It was the combination 
of these six traits, never being all present together in any one society before this time, which 
allowed totalitarianism to become a modern form of complete dictatorship.104  Once it was in 
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place, this specific combination also ensured that the average citizen had no hope of fighting 
against this new governing system.105   
 Not only did this system affect the people living within the borders of the totalitarian 
state, so too did it influence foreign relations.  Totalitarians reject conventional diplomatic 
behavior.  As stated in Friedrich and Brzezinski’s book, “[totalitarianism] rejects the possibility 
of peace between communism and capitalism… War is a necessary means to the end the 
Bolshevik strives.” For how else can the workers of the world rise up and end societal 
stratification?106  With this in mind, Friedrich and Brzezinski believed that the only way for 
totalitarian dictators to interact with the world is through constant struggle, leading both men to 
affirm in their book that “those who reject [totalitarianism] have no alternative but to strive for 
its destruction.”107  In the age of nuclear weapons, this was a dangerous idea, yet Brzezinski 
would adhere to this point of view throughout his future political career. 
 Just as Kissinger sought to influence more than just academics with his publishing of 
Confluence, Brzezinski wanted to as well.  However, these two men approached this goal in 
different ways.  While Kissinger focused on diplomatic interrelationships between countries, 
Brzezinski looked to the future and wrote about what might happen if communism continued.108  
In an interview, he once exclaimed, “I want to influence the world, shape American policy.”109  
At the same time he coauthored Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy with Friedrich, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski worked on his doctoral dissertation, “The Permanent Purge: Politics in 
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Soviet Totalitarianism,” under the tutelage of Harvard historian Professor Merle Fainsod.110  In 
this work, Brzezinski focuses on the purges which occurred in the 1930s, asserting that these led 
to Stalin’s solidification of power.  The secret police enthusiastically executed these purges in 
order to “perpetuate or extend the terror.”111  Brzezinski describes how the members of the secret 
police started to gain power through these violent purges.  Once this happened, Stalin then turned 
on these same executioners.  He then rid the police of the more overly ambitious members.  
Thus, Stalin reasserted his power and preserved his brand of totalitarianism.112  Although Stalin 
kept his power after these purges, it was at a price.  Brzezinski was quick to point out this as one 
of many “evolving dysfunctions” of the Soviet Union, always pointing out “the cracks in the 
façade.”113  Zbigniew Brzezinski concluded his doctoral thesis by stating that these purges 
confirmed “the gap between the elite and the general population, since it settles everything inside 
the hierarchy, and eliminates any lingering notion that spontaneous leadership might arise.”114   
With the twin publishing of both Totalitarian Dictatorship and The Permanent Purge in 
the same year, the term totalitarianism became even more preponderant in writings about the 
Soviet Union.  The influence of these two works would last well into the next decade, becoming 
a staple in secondary and college textbooks.115  This included Fainsod’s book Smolensk under 
Soviet Rule, published in 1958.  Brzezinski helped Fainsod comb through archival papers of the 
Communist Party from Smolensk, first seized by the Nazis in 1941 and eventually moved to the 
United States in 1945.  These papers, and the subsequent book, gave firsthand proof of 
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Brzezinski’s vision of the Soviet regime as an omniscient and omnipresent totalitarian power; the 
papers give a personal account of totalitarianism as seen by the people.116  Thanks to these 
works, as well as several others published through the end of the 1950s and into the 1960s, all of 
which condemned the Union of Soviet Social Republics and its totalitarian state, Brzezinski 
earned the reputation of being the premier Sovietologist in the United States, not just at the 
Russian Research Center at Harvard University.117     
 Unfortunately, unlike Henry Kissinger, Harvard University did not offer a professorship 
to Zbigniew Brzezinski.  Therefore, he opted to work at Columbia University in New York City 
in 1960.  Although offered more lucrative positions at the University of Chicago and Berkeley, 
Brzezinski chose to work in New York because of its proximity to Washington DC, “along the 
corridor of power.”118  This move allowed for him to concentrate on the Russian Institute as well 
as the Research Institute on Communist Affairs.  This also allowed him the time to write books 
and articles condemning the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the success of which led to 
Harvard offering Brzezinski tenure only two years after turning him down for associate 
professor.  Although he was tempted by the proposition, he declined because he felt his “destiny 
was no longer in Cambridge but right where he was, in New York, halfway between Cambridge 
and Washington.”119 
 It was during the mid-1950s that Brzezinski not only denounced the Soviet Union as a 
totalitarian state, but he also judged the United States responses to Soviet malevolence as 
“essentially static, even conservative.”120  Brzezinski hoped that after the death of Joseph Stalin 
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in 1953 the tensions could ease and the unification of Europe would commence.121  However, 
prior to his death, Stalin used propaganda films that focused on local leaders in various parts of 
the Soviet Union and its satellite states, highlighting those who were in lockstep with his 
dictatorial policies.  Two of the men featured in the marketing schemes were Nikita Khrushchev 
and Leonid Brezhnev.  Both men rose through the Communist ranks, avoided purges, and 
eventually became premier mainly by mirroring and furthering Stalin’s policies, as well as 
utilizing his tactics.122  Brzezinski reiterated this thought in an article for The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science by writing, “It is noteworthy that since 
Stalin’s purges of the early 1930s, the Soviet leadership has made an effort to restrict party 
membership.”123  Only those loyal to Stalin’s ideology could join the Soviet Communist Party.  
Therefore, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, in turn, would use totalitarian tactics reminiscent of Stalin 
to keep the Soviet empire intact.  This was especially acute when Soviet satellite states such as 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia started seeking independence from Moscow, the suppression of 
which came swiftly.  For this, neither man received severe chastising for their actions from the 
United States.   
 Brzezinski condemned America’s foreign policy for its lack of action after both the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968.  In response to both events, 
Moscow responded with military might to quash them.  Unfortunately, these uprisings coincided 
with the Suez Canal crisis and the Vietnam War respectively, therefore Washington felt its 
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attention belonged elsewhere124  However, Brzezinski did not think the other world events 
should preclude America’s actions in Europe.  Zbigniew Brzezinski believed that the Soviet 
Union overstepped by invading these European countries, and since the United States did not 
respond in kind, America was essentially allowing the Soviet Union to keep the continent 
divided.   
 The first event, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, came about a few months after Nikita 
Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, which condemned Joseph Stalin, the Stalin cult, and his bloody 
regime.  While the world hoped the new Soviet leader might lift the Iron Curtain, allowing for 
the satellite states of Eastern Europe to form their own sovereign and elected governments, 
Khrushchev showed his true colors on November 4, 1956, just thirteen days after the people of 
Hungary expressed interest in separating themselves from Moscow’s grip.  Brzezinski described 
the events as follows, “In Hungary, the Communist party of some 900,000 members 
disintegrated in a few glorious October days.  Its power was reimposed only by Soviet bayonets 
and a new party was constructed.”125  Unwilling to let a satellite state leave the Soviet Union, 
Khrushchev sent in troops to quell the rebellion.  Despite the Soviet Union militarizing 
imperialism with the launching of their newly acquired intercontinental missiles, the United 
States refused to take action, thus allowing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to oppress a 
country within its sphere of influence unchecked.  Despite a Hungarian diplomat pleading for 
help from the Department of State in a teletype conversation sent on the night of November 3, 
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and into the morning of November 4, 1956, all while the Soviet tanks came rolling through the 
city of Budapest, the United States’ only response was the following:  
 Hungary in its present exceptionally difficult situation turns with particular confidence 
 to the love of peace, the wisdom, and the bravery which the President up to now has so 
 often firmly shown. Although the people of Hungary are determined to resist with 
 desperation the attack upon them, there is no doubt that in this unequal struggle it will be 
 defeated if it does not receive help. In this moment [the] most necessary kind of help is 
 political not military.126 
 
In no uncertain terms, the United States responded to Hungary’s appeals by saying that the only 
aid forthcoming is that of words, not actions.  By not helping out the people in Hungary, 
containment amounted to the American government “accept[ing] the status quo.”127  Therefore, 
the Soviets had a free hand in suppressing the rebelling, including purging the Hungarian 
government of dissidents, including former Prime Minister Imre Nagy, and the Soviets installed 
a puppet government.  János Kádár, a centrist party figure, took Nagy’s place and supported 
reconciliation with the Soviet Union.128  These Soviet actions horrified and hardened 
Brzezinski’s views toward the Soviet Union, who supported liberation of the captive peoples of 
Eastern Europe, a policy President Eisenhower dismissed due to his not wanting to start a nuclear 
war, which he believed would happen if the United States challenged this event in the Soviet 
bloc.  To Brzezinski, the American lack of military reaction to the Hungarian Revolution made 
the United States look like a coward to its European allies.   
 In order to ensure that other satellite states would not opt for revolution, Khrushchev 
began to focus on the “central front,” which consisted of the countries along the Iron Curtin.  
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Khrushchev went so far as to explore a nuclear option, which became possible in 1959, with the 
successful test of their first ICBM.  Now, “the Soviet leaders launched [a] new campaign to 
coerce the West out of Berlin, through sustained military-political pressure.”129  With Berlin 
deep behind the Iron Curtin, Khrushchev wanted to remove the western powers that controlled 
three-fourths of the city.  The launch was fortuitous because it coincided with Khrushchev 
solidifying his position as Stalin’s ideological successor.  Once the Soviet leaders realized their 
philosophical and political system would remain intact after a regime change, they once again set 
their sights on expanding their empire.130   
 Khrushchev’s successful consolidation of power caused Brzezinski to revamp his 
definition of a totalitarian regime.  The six characteristics he laid out with Friedrich really only 
applied to the beginning of totalitarianism, with Stalin.  By the early 1960s, totalitarianism 
morphed to the point that it only included three characteristics: “(1) an ideology based on 
refounding society and humanity; (2) the absence of moral, legal, or traditional restraints on the 
exercise of power; (3) a logic of action and destruction or absorption of all the other social 
groups.”131 This new definition reflects that the post-Stalin Soviet Union saw a relaxation of 
some control over the population; however, this did not extend to the satellite states, including 
Hungary, where Khrushchev ensured that violence would keep the Communist Party in power.132  
With these changes, Brzezinski did feel there was a possibility for Washington to attack 
Moscow.  Instead of just accepting the stranglehold of communism in Eastern Europe, 
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Brzezinski advocated an alternative plan “combining patience and ruse…bring[ing] into play the 
natural tendency of Eastern Europeans to be attracted by the West…lead[ing] to distancing from 
Moscow.”133  Although Brzezinski did not want another world war to break out in response to 
the abuses happening to the European nations behind the Iron Curtin, this did not mean that the 
United States should just idly accept any aggressive moves from the Soviet Union. 
 In other parts of the world, the United States was able to flex its military muscle.  The 
reassertion of American political and military strength during the Cuban Missile Crisis led to 
tactical changes in the Soviet Union as well as a leadership shift.  In 1964, Leonid Brezhnev 
replaced Nikita Khrushchev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
With Brezhnev came a change of Soviet foreign policy towards the West, mainly consisting of 
what Brzezinski would call fragmentation.  Although the Soviets still desired the United States to 
pull out of Europe all together, Brezhnev and his ambassadors pursued a two-pronged attack 
along diplomatic and political lines, instead of using nuclear options.134   This fragmentation 
policy sought to disrupt American – European political and economic unity.  Brezhnev hoped 
this disruption would lead President Johnson to give up the thought of a united Europe.135  
Economically, since 1948 the United States sent millions of dollars in financial and material aid 
through the Marshall Plan in an effort to rebuild and re-unify Europe.  Although this aid was a 
good idea, Brzezinski believed America missed an opportunity; this opportunity being to 
“employ a first nuclear strike to protect its interests abroad [and] give its verbal threats a greater 
credibility.”136  With this strategy, Brzezinski saw the strategic use of atomic weapons to 
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eliminate enemy warehouses and other war materiel as a way of preventing the Cold War from 
starting.  In essence, Zbigniew Brzezinski, just like Henry Kissinger, saw the validity of a limited 
nuclear war that would devastate the Soviet Union, thus stopping the threat of communism 
before the setting up of spheres of influence.  By missing this chance, the United States 
essentially allowed the Soviet Union the opportunity to start to build its own stockpile.  Once the 
Soviet Union thought they gained nuclear parity with the United States, the Soviet Union felt 
confident enough to crack down on its satellite states, thus making “the Soviet presence in 
Europe … a combination of very traditional imperialism with an ideological compulsion for 
creating carbon copies of the Soviet model in countries subject to Soviet control.”137  Brezhnev 
would demonstrate this belief in Czechoslovakia before the decade’s end.   
 Just as Nikita Khrushchev quashed the Hungarian Uprising of 1956, so too did Leonid 
Brezhnev crush the Prague Spring of 1968.  Despite the fact that the Czechoslovakian leader 
Alexander Dubček only sought to reform his country’s political and cultural life by giving 
additional rights to, the Soviet Union refused to allow this to happen.138  Despite Dubček’s 
insistence on remaining loyal to Moscow, the Soviet premier refused to listen.  Instead, Brezhnev 
authorized the Warsaw Pact countries to invade their neighbor with heavily armored tanks.  
Eventually the Soviet Union forced Dubček to step down, replacing him with Gustáv Husák, 
who used the process of normalization to return the country back to its pre-revolutionary, pro-
Soviet days.  In response to this aggressive move by the Warsaw Pact, the term totalitarianism 
came back into political use, after being on the wane since the Cuban Missile Crisis.139  Stating 
that only Moscow could intervene in its satellite states, the Brezhnev Doctrine reinforced the 
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view that even under new leadership the Soviet Union still operated within a totalitarian regime.  
In Brzezinski’s eyes, the doctrine was an assertive measure to stop bridge-building between the 
East and the West.140    
 During 1968, America’s military was responding to the Tet Offensive in Vietnam.  
President Johnson could not fathom having to fight a two-front war on Communism.  Therefore, 
in response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the United States again did nothing.  For 
the second time in less than fifteen years, Moscow gave Washington a reason to respond 
militarily.  However, already bogged down in a quagmire raging in Southeast Asia, Johnson and 
his administration wanted to avoid a second war against Communism.  Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk fervently pushed for this “no action” policy because the United States and the Soviet Union 
were on track toward détente, having just signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty less than 
two months before the Warsaw Pact Invasion, and with atomic limitation talks scheduled begin 
in the near future.141  Not wanting to deter this positive progression in relations, Secretary Rusk 
along with Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford wrote a letter to Premier Brezhnev, with 
President Johnson’s assent, stating the following position:  
 On this matter, the policy of the United States and of our NATO allies has, moreover, 
 been clear: We ourselves have no desire or intention of taking any action in Eastern 
 Europe which might threaten the security of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, we have 
 been working towards the possibility that NATO and the Warsaw Pact might negotiate 
 mutual troop withdrawals or reductions and gradually ameliorate the confrontation in 
 Central Europe and open the way towards stable peace in that critical area.142  
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Therefore, in order to avoid another world war, the United States “would not respond militarily 
to the renewed rape of Czechoslovakia.”143 
This lack of response seemed to undo the hegemony the United States gained after the 
Cuban Missile Crisis.  Soviet totalitarianism once again proved that in order for the Communist 
bloc to remain under Moscow’s rule, force and hostility were necessary.144  Yet, the United 
States refused to stop this destructive force.  Due to America’s lack of response to the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, Brzezinski asserted that the “American establishment appears to be 
intellectually paralyzed and politically pusillanimous … It is with Europe that the United States 
shares certain concepts of law and personal freedom.  Unless America continues actively to 
promote a broad vision of European restoration America does not have a foreign policy.”145  
Brzezinski emphasized that in order for the United States to keep world supremacy, it must 
sustain an effective military presence in Europe; Europe needed the United States to act as a 
“sword defending Europe instead of a shield protecting their allies.”146  Of course, the sword to 
which Brzezinski alluded to was the threat of nuclear war.  Allowing the Soviet Union to invade 
a European country unchecked diminished the effectiveness of American foreign policy.147  This 
lack of American response to the Soviet invasions of both Hungary and Czechoslovakia ensured 
that the Iron Curtain stayed in place, again making the United States look weak upon the world 
stage.148   
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 Brzezinski hoped with the election of President Nixon that America would again be 
tough on Communism.  With one of America’s most fervent anti-Communist politicians in the 
White House, Brzezinski felt he could share his “hard-nosed containment doctrine” on the world 
stage.  He pushed for aggressive military maneuvers, in both Europe and Vietnam.149  Brzezinski 
believed that in order for the United States to topple the Soviet Union, America had to not only 
recommit to its European allies on the continent, but also push back against Soviet incursions in 
other parts of the world.150  It was at this point that Brzezinski began criticizing his fellow 
Harvard alumnus, calling Kissinger’s approach to the Soviet Union “too timid, essentially static, 
even conservative.”151  Brzezinski associated Kissinger with détente, even though he would 
eventually pursue similar policies under Carter as his National Security Advisor.  At this point, 
Brzezinski did not believe that a relaxation of tensions could occur due to a fundamental 
difference in the understanding of the term’s definition.152  For the United States, détente was a 
comprehensive agreement which saw both sides reducing their stockpiles; for the Soviet Union, 
détente amounted to peaceful coexistence where neither side would seek to influence countries 
outside of their own sphere of influence.153  Although Brzezinski did not want a large scale war, 
he felt that Nixon and Kissinger went too far, stating “we are not only helping the Soviet 
economy but we are also buttressing the Soviet political system.”154  Also, détente allowed for 
American complicity against the Soviet Union’s growing boldness.155  Therefore, Brzezinski 
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supported SALT I only in as much as he viewed it as a testing ground to see if the Soviet Union 
actually wanted to stop their nuclear buildup.156 
Then, in 1976, Zbigniew Brzezinski went from foreign policy expert and theorist to 
foreign policy advisor with the election of America’s thirty-ninth president, James Earl Carter Jr.  
President Carter believed that government, and all of its policies, should adhere to the standards 
upheld by its people.  In particular, he wanted this applied to foreign policy and once in office, 
Carter immediately wanted to tackle the arms control issue.  First, in his inaugural address, he 
expressed his hope of achieving not only an international agreement on human rights but also he 
wanted the American people to know that his presidency would seek the “ultimate goal – the 
elimination of all nuclear weapons from this earth.”157  In saying this, Carter “became the first 
president to declare publicly complete nuclear disarmament (in contrast to arms control) as a 
goal for US policy [author’s emphasis].”158  Although eager to end the nuclear arms race, 
unfortunately Carter lacked the knowledge of how to draft foreign policy and treaties.  Hence, 
Carter looked to Zbigniew Brzezinski for help and appointed him his National Security Advisor. 
Previously, both men worked together on the Trilateral Commission, an elite group 
focusing on bringing Europe, North America, and Japan together economically and politically.159  
From this group sprang a trust between Carter and Brzezinski that would last throughout Carter’s 
presidency.  Carter, whose only previous political experience consisted of being a one-time 
governor of Georgia, knew he was weak in his knowledge of foreign policy issues, therefore he 
relied on Brzezinski’s expertise, deferring to his judgment.160  Carter, like Nixon, allowed all 
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Soviet Union intelligence briefings to come through Brzezinski “and by no one else.”161  Carter 
would go even further and elevate Brzezinski’s position to one on par with Cabinet positions.  
This action solidified Brzezinski as Carter’s main source for foreign policy advice on key issues, 
much to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s chagrin.162   
Picking up where Kissinger left off, as Nixon’s and Ford’s National Security Advisor and 
then Secretary of State, Brzezinski had almost complete control of American foreign policy.  He 
would center it on three pillars: one, maintaining a powerful military; two, encouraging division 
and nationalism within the communist bloc; and three, spreading Western ideology via American 
programming on Radio Free Europe, transmitted across the Iron Curtain.163  These three pillars 
would help to provoke the crumbling of the Soviet Union.164 
Once in charge of the National Security Council, Brzezinski wanted to challenge the 
Soviet military buildup since the 1960s.  Brzezinski wanted to target not just the Soviet Union’s 
economy, but also their political and military leaders.165  By targeting leaders, Brzezinski hoped 
for a weakening of the interior structure, predicated on the strength of the Politburo and the 
Soviet Armed Forces, eventually leading to a collapse of the entire system.166  This did not go 
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unnoticed by Moscow, with the top Soviet leadership writing in a report that “Dr. Brzezinski was 
seen as the arch enemy, a man not to be trusted.”167  He wanted to push ten goals for the Carter 
administration in the first four years.  Although number four stressed the arms limitation and 
reduction talks with the Soviet Union, number ten spelled out a harsher stance: “To maintain a 
defense posture capable of deterring the Soviet Union, both on the strategic and conventional 
level, from hostile acts and from political pressure.”168  In order to achieve goal number ten, the 
United States would need to rethink its defenses as well as improve the military might of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  Brzezinski, like Carter, wanted to pursue a 
commitment to human rights.169  By focusing on the Soviet Union’s abuse of its citizens, like 
what happened during the Hungarian Revolution and the Prague Spring, Brzezinski hoped to 
gain “greater global support and focus global attention on the glaring internal weaknesses of the 
Soviet system.”170   
With this in mind, Brzezinski began to separate himself from Kissinger’s legacy by 
crafting of the second strategic arms limitation treaty.  Brzezinski did not believe that the only 
alternative to détente was war.  Instead of just focusing on nuclear missile numbers, Brzezinski 
wanted the SALT II agreement to reflect a relationship between the United States and the Soviet 
Union that had evolved from massive retaliation to one based on “competition and 
cooperation.”171  Only by basing foreign negotiations on this policy could both countries achieve 
peace.  This comprehensive view of détente led to the Soviet Union attacking Brzezinski. In his 
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ideas, Moscow saw “a challenge to their legitimacy and thus to their very existence.”172 
Zbigniew Brzezinski replied, “I must say their fears are justified.”173  Brzezinski talked in code; 
for to him “[the] words ‘reciprocal’ and ‘comprehensive’ meant … that we should insist on equal 
treatment (retaliating in kind if necessary)” against the Soviet Union.174  It is no accident that 
Brzezinski wanted to organize the SALT II process, for this was the only way he could ensure 
that there was no effect on American nuclear stockpiles.175 
The biggest difference between Brzezinski and Kissinger was Brzezinski’s public 
declarations of his intentions.  Although he spoke in code, he presented his views to the world.  
Premier Brezhnev liked Nixon-Kissinger backdoor foreign policy making, which continued 
under Ford.  When Carter and Brzezinski announced to the world that the only deal they were 
willing to make with the Soviets involved addressing human rights issues, this shocked the 
Brezhnev.  The public proclamations made by President Carter regarding the necessity for 
human rights clauses caught the Soviet government off guard.  Under Carter’s predecessor 
Gerald Ford, the Soviets believed they reached the basic tenets of the SALT II negotiations at the 
Vladivostok Summit in 1974.176  The Soviet Premier did not expect the changes presented by 
Carter and Brzezinski, therefore Brezhnev rebuffed initial requests for peace talks.   
Eventually, this strategy proved harmful to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.  The 
Soviet economy suffered greatly under the pressures of the arms race, therefore Brezhnev could 
no longer ignore Carter.  However, to save face on the world stage, the Soviet government 
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decided to send Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to the negotiating table.  Gromyko made 
every effort to come to a quick agreement on SALT II provisions.177  Brzezinski saw all 
negotiations with members of totalitarian dictatorships as false; “to them, such an occasion is 
another opportunity to undermine the enemy.”178  Therefore, Brzezinski used these peace talks as 
strategy sessions, believing that détente under Kissinger worked more in the favor of the Soviets 
than it did the United States, therefore he did not want Gromyko to have the upper hand.179  As 
historian David Rothkopf points out, “[Brzezinski] was, to a greater extent than many of his 
colleagues, more committed to containment than ‘balance’.”180  With the nickname ‘Mr. Nyet’, 
Moscow could feel reassured that Gromyko would not buckle under pressure from Brzezinski at 
the negotiating table.181  Brzezinski relished talking to the hard-lined Gromyko for this allowed 
him to convince Carter that the only way to “stabilize relations with the Soviet Union was to 
threaten them.”182  The hawkish tendencies of Brzezinski began to influence American foreign 
policy.  For instance, Brzezinski’s proposition for SALT II consisted of the United States 
limiting “the number of heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs [air-launched cruise missiles] 
with ranges up to 2500 km to a total of 250; during the same period, the Soviet Union will also 
limit the production and deployment of Backfires to the total of 250 … The U.S. is not prepared 
to count each such heavy bomber as the equivalent of a MIRVed missile launcher, to be counted 
against the MIRV ceiling [author’s emphasis].”183  Like his predecessor, Brzezinski also refused 
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to lessen the number of MIRVed missiles, which were superior to any nuclear weapons system 
the Soviets had. 
However, these tendencies eventually went too far.  Although Brzezinski wanted to 
improve conditions for Soviet citizens, he would not protect them at any cost.  Whenever human 
rights came up during the nuclear negotiations, Gromyko kept reminding the United States of 
their own flawed human rights record.  Alluding to the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment to 
pass Congress, Gromyko said “that he was concerned that the public debate on this issue would 
be disadvantageous to both sides… Brezhnev does not want to see the human rights issue 
become a test of wills between the two countries because then Brezhnev would be ‘forced to 
answer’.”184  Clearly, Brezhnev was not going to accept all human rights issues on American 
terms, dragging out the SALT II talks.  As the negotiations with Gromyko continued with no end 
in sight, Brzezinski made a choice.  As he would state in his memoir about being National 
Security Advisor, “when a choice between the two had to be made, between projecting U.S. 
power or enhancing human rights … I felt that power had to come first.  Without credible 
American power, we would simply not be able either to protect our interests or to advance more 
humane goals.”185  In a memorandum, Zbigniew Brzezinski tried to persuade President Carter to 
acquiesce on the human rights issue no longer.  He wrote that by allowing the human rights issue 
to overrun the nuclear talks, the Soviet Union made all the calls, thus relegating the United States 
to an inferior negotiating position.  Brzezinski summed up his feelings as follows: 
Both in tone and occasionally in substance, we have been excessively acquiescent, and 
that the country craves, and our national security needs, both a more assertive tone and a 
more assertive substance to our foreign policy. I believe that both for international 
reasons as well as for domestic political reasons you ought to deliberately toughen both 
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the tone and the substance of our foreign policy. The country associates assertiveness 
with leadership, and the world at large expects American leadership insofar as the Soviet 
challenge is concerned. That challenge is real, and a recognition of it does not mean that 
we have to abandon such positive objectives as arms control and notably SALT II. We 
should be mature enough to be able to seek, all at the same time, SALT II; and more 
defense efforts; and pursue a more assertive foreign policy [author’s emphasis].186 
This positive correspondence reflects that Brzezinski, although he supported liberation of Eastern 
Europe, would not allow for the SALT II negotiations to end over the human rights issue.  
Instead, the United States needed to be aggressive during the SALT II nuclear talks in order to 
appear tough on the world stage.  In Brzezinski’s opinion, for too long the United States seemed 
inferior to the Soviet Union when discussing nuclear arms proliferation. 
It was at this point that President Carter, wanting terms reflecting his stance on human 
rights, sent Secretary of State Vance to the negotiating table along with Brzezinski.  Both Carter 
and Vance wanted deep cuts in nuclear missile numbers, yet Brzezinski repeatedly pushed for 
only modest ones.187  Brzezinski feared that even if the United States drastically reduced their 
nuclear missile numbers, there was no guarantee the Soviet Union would follow suit.  As 
Carter’s Secretary of Defense Harold Brown described it, “Brzezinski had, I think, a much more 
apocalyptic view of the world … [especially] toward the Soviets.”188  The United States might 
falter, and to Brzezinski, nothing could be worse for “there is no alternative to the West and there 
simply must be no decline of the West.”189  Therefore, Brzezinski pushed Carter to inform his 
Joint Chiefs of Staff that throughout the SALT II talks, there was a definite “commitment to a 
strong national defense and, in particular, a vigorous strategic force modernization program.”190  
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Already irked at Brzezinski’s influence on foreign policy, Vance saw this continuing harsh 
stance as problematic, therefore Vance then went to Moscow by himself in order to finish the 
SALT II negotiations.  Brzezinski knew that Vance would somehow guarantee that the Soviet 
Union would end up having more nuclear weapons than the United States.  Through talks lasting 
from April to May 1979, “Vance and Gromyko resolved their outstanding differences, agreeing 
to limit both superpowers to 2250 (initially 2400) delivery vehicles, while sublimits would 
restrict particular categories of weapons, including heavy ICBMs, and separate agreements 
would limit the deployment of cruise missiles and tactical bombers.”191   
These terms were unacceptable to Brzezinski.  A little over a month before the scheduled 
meeting between Carter and Brezhnev to sign the new treaty in Vienna, Brzezinski urged Carter 
to reconsider.  In a memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski warned, “We have had intelligence that 
indicates that the Soviet Union is developing a new lighter missile to replace the aging SS–11s.  
All the negotiations on new ICBM parameters seemed aimed at permitting just such a 
development in addition to developing another new MIRV missile under the ICBM exception in 
the agreement.”192  Despite his warning, both countries accepted the terms reached by Vance and 
Gromyko, and Premier Leonid Brezhnev and President Jimmy Carter signed SALT II on June 
18, 1979 in Vienna. 
Although Brzezinski did not successfully stop President Carter from signing SALT II, he 
was able to push his hawkish agenda again with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  Brzezinski 
“devised and recommended United States military support” of the Afghan people to stop the 
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Soviet incursion.193  This time, Brzezinski was effective in his drive for intervention, and for the 
first time the United States adopted “a policy of directly supporting actions aimed at killing 
Soviet troops.”194  Finally, Brzezinski was able to find a way to create and exploit a weakness in 
the Soviet Union, for the ensuing quagmire would eventually be one of the mitigating factors in 
the Soviet Union’s collapse a decade later, ending the Cold War confrontation.195  At home, the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to the United States Senate not ratifying the SALT II 
agreement.  Once the boots were on the ground, détente died.   
Concluding Remarks 
 Throughout the 1970s, arguably the second most powerful men behind the President of 
the United States were two immigrants from Europe.  Wanting the chance to influence foreign 
affairs on a national level, they espoused a strong anti-Communist policy in an effort to steer the 
thoughts of men working in Washington.  Both men would become pillars of the Washington 
establishment in the role of National Security Advisor under Presidents Nixon and Carter.  As 
Justin Vaïsse states, “they shared essential features and a common achievement… Together, 
these two immigrants invented a new model that men would later emulate, and they made a 
profound mark on American foreign policy, one that resonates to this day.”196  As students 
attending Harvard University, America’s premier institution of higher learning, these men 
solidified their beliefs.  Under the tutelage of the old guard, these two men forged a new path as 
foreign-born specialists of European policy.  Not only was their ability to speak European 
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languages a plus, but their European background contributed to their success as well.  These men 
remembered a strong, pre-totalitarian Europe, one they wanted to see free again.     
In order to do this, both men urged limited nuclear war in an effort to stop the spread of 
Communism in Europe.  Although to the twenty-first century observer, these powerful men 
advocating the United States use its nuclear options seems extreme, an understanding of their 
youthful experience with totalitarian regimes can help explain their attitudes and motivations.  
Kissinger saw families disappear into the night in Nazi Germany while Brzezinski’s father 
witnessed the purging of intellectuals and dissidents in Soviet Ukraine.  Neither man advocated a 
large-scale war, yet neither believed that totalitarianism should go unchecked in the world.  In 
addition, neither man believed the United States went far enough in addressing the atrocities 
committed back in their respective homelands before the Second World War.   
These men left Europe as children, leaving behind countries in the midst of totalitarian 
political terror.  Once at Harvard, political theorist Hannah Arendt gave both men a working 
definition of the regime in charge of the Soviet Union.  In both men’s minds, communism 
became synonymous with totalitarianism.  To them, communism was a false prophecy; 
American patriotism and progress, they believed, therefore called for an uncompromising, 
government-led resistance by the American government.  Both men admitted that, as 
policymakers, they depended more on convictions acquired before entering office than on new 
material they received as National Security Advisors.  As evidenced by their early life 
experiences, as well as their influences during college and their readings of Hannah Arendt, it is 
argued here that their youthful experience in Europe led to their tough stance against Soviet 
totalitarianism.  The shaping of both men came from a personal history that shaped their beliefs.  
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As Kissinger once wrote, “I had seen evil in the world, and I knew it was there, and I knew that 
there are some things you have to fight for.”197 
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